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TERRORISM: A Global Phenomenon
Mandating a Unified International Response
JACQUELINE ANN CARBERRY"
INTRODUCTION
"Base! Base! Terrorism! Terrorism!"' shouted Benson Okuku Bwaku,
the guard manning the United States Embassy in Nairobi, over his walkie-
talkie. He let out this alarming cry in response to the 3.5-ton Mitsubishi
Canter carrying the bomb that moments later killed 247 people and injured
over 5000.2 Retaliating thirteen days after the deadly embassy bombings, the
United States launched missile strikes against the terrorist camps in
Afghanistan. President Clinton boldly stated: "Our mission was clear-to
strike at the network of radical groups affiliated with and funded by Osama
bin Laden, perhaps the pre-eminent organizer and financier of international
terrorism in the world today. 3
This all too recent tragedy brings to light the ever-present threat of
terrorism. Terrorism is a complex and highly pervasive global problem which
continues to threaten the international community.4 It defies courts, police,
intelligence agencies, national governments, and the United Nations alike.
States agree that international cooperation is vital to combating terrorism;
however, coordination of international efforts has proven extremely
* J.D. Candidate, 1999, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.A., 1992 Davidson
College. I would like to dedicate this Comment to my parents, Richard and Jacqueline Carberry and to my
sister, Alicia, for their unconditional love and immeasurable support throughout every dream I have
pursued. Their encouragement and guidance should be a model for every family.
1. Karl Vick & Stephen Buckley, Basel Basel Terrorisml Terrorism/; Gate Guard in Nairobi
Blocked Bombers, WASH. PosT, Aug. 13, 1998, at Al.
2. See id. After a visit to Kenya and Tanzania, a panel commissioned by the State Department
recommended $14 billion be allocated over the next ten years to upgrade diplomatic posts. See Panel Calls
for More Embassy Security, HERALD TIMEs (Bloomington, Ind.), Jan. 9, 1999, at A3.
3. Sarah Jackson-Han, US Strikes at "Terrorist Network inAfghanistan Sudan, AaENCE FRANcE-
PRESSE, Aug. 21, 1998, atB2.
4. See Tim Weiner, Terrorism's Worldwide Toll Was High in 1996, U.S. Report Says, N.Y. TIMES,
May 1, 1997, at 9. The State Department in its annual report stated that in 1996 international terrorist
attacks killed 311 people worldwide, one of the highest death tolls registered. See id.; see also USIA
Foreign Press Center Briefing, Fed. News Serv., June 25, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Arcnews File (citing terrorism as one of three global issues to be addressed at the upcoming G-7 Summit
Meeting).
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complicated. The processes of globalization5 and internationalization are key
facets to the vexing challenge of effective antiterrorist enforcement measures.
The global problems and challenges facing the international community
transcend States' capabilities to deal with them effectively as autonomous
entities.7 Terrorism, like the spread of infectious diseases, threats to the
environment, and human rights violations, represents a global phenomenon.
Because terrorism affects humankind, regardless of national boundaries, it is,
therefore, more precisely defined as a global, rather than an international,
problem.'
What makes terrorism "global?" Several factors contribute to terrorism's
global nature. First, terrorism is not restricted to any one region, State, or
jurisdiction. The force of its impact goes beyond any one designated area;
humankind feels its repercussions. Second, the increased mobility of terrorists
to cross borders, acquire resources in numerous States, and access advanced
communication systems, like the Internet, creates a global setting. Third, the
victims of terrorist attacks are not necessarily even members of the same State.
For instance, when a terrorist targets an airplane, the passengers might
5. In this modem age, "[d]ifferent sorts of problems-those of environment, disease, human rights,
and other 'global issues'--have also become important" Wendy Schoener, Note, Non-Governmental
Organizations and GlobalActivism: Legal and InformalApproaches, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 537,
537 (1997). The multiplying number of global issues, the increased number of non-State actors, in this
instance-terrorists, and the recognition of the need to confront such problems for the sake of "the common
good" present a global context.
6. Internationalization denotes "a form of institutionalized cooperation between States." Jost
Delbrick, The Role of the United Nations in Dealing With Global Problems, 4 IN. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 277,278 n.3 (1997).
7. See id. at 292. See also An Interview with U.N Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan, FLETCHER
FORUM WORLD AFFAIRs, Summer/Fall 1997 [hereinafter Annan]. Annan stated, "[olrganized crime, ethnic
and religious conflict and terrorism are all part of a complex array of problems that pose fundamental threats
to societies and the global social order-and are thus of urgent concern .... Id. at 3. Mr. Annan expressed
his view that State sovereignty "must, in extreme circumstances, give way to the overriding moral
imperative to alleviate human suffering, including systematic violations of human rights, and to achieve
common benefits on a global or regional fiameworIC." Id. at 1.
8. See Jost DelbrOck, Globalization of Law, Politics, and Markets-Implications for Domestic
Law-A European Perspective, I IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 9, 10-11 (1993).
9. "Global" is not synonymous with "universal." See id. at 11.
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potentially be citizens of numerous countries."0  Furthermore, the
organizational structure of modem terrorist groups is diffuse. The task of
detecting and apprehending terrorists, therefore, is not the atomized effort of
any one particular State, nor is any one State assigned the task of single-
handedly curtailing this global threat.
The challenge of combating terrorism intricately intertwines globalization
and internationalization. Though States remain the key actors in the fight
against terrorism, the growing pressure for heightened cooperation has become
critical to the development of effective antiterrorist measures. "The
globalization and brutalization of modem violence make it abundantly clear
that we have entered a new 'age of terrorism' with all its frightening
ramifications."" Terrorism as a global force demands more from States.
Terrorism exceeds the authority of any one State; this phenomenon transcends
the borders and the jurisdiction of individual States. As such, current
enforcement devices are predominantly international. However, international
cooperatives to combat terrorism are hindered at a certain point by individual
States' varying definitions of terrorism, differing internal legal systems, and
conflicting conceptions of the proper role of government. While States
continue to act in response to this global threat, the pressure of terrorism
appears to require a higher level of integration, uniformity, and
harmonization.
10. A targeted airplane, carrying members from various States, highlights the global threat of terrorism
trascending State borders while accentuating the international State actors which must respond to protect
their citizens.
The postmodern paradox here is that such an international political context, to the
extent that it does exist within the U.N. is entirely dependent upon individual States;
but, the world community 'international terrorism' creates is in fact not that. It is a
community of air travelers with many diverse passports and no single representative
government.
Beverly Allen, Talking "Terrorism ": Ideologies and Paradigms in a Postmodern World, 22 SYRACUSE
J. INT'L L & CoM 7, 9 (1996).
11. Terrorism in Algeria: Its Effect on the Country's Political Scenario, on Regional Stability, and
on Global Security: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Comm. on Int'l Relations,
104th Cong. (1995) (statement of Professor Yonah Alexander, Director, Terrorism Studies Program, The
George Washington University).
12. "Today's dynamic global marketplace and world order present new problems for international
regimes. To combat [terrorism and) money laundering effectively, international regimes must be flexible,
stable, able to make decisions, expend resources, enact laws, provide judicial assistance, and otherwise
cooperate in transnational matters." Francis R. Monaco, Comment, Europol: The Culmination of the
European Union's International Police Cooperation Efforts, 19 FORDHAM INT'L UJ. 247, 256 n.73
(1995).
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This Comment examines the nexus between the global force of terrorism
and internationalized antiterrorist efforts. The goal of a terrorism
counteraction policy "is to make the general political, economic and
psychological climate in which terrorists operate more hostile" in order to
reduce terrorism to a point where it cannot divert a nation from its stated
policies.13 However, in dealing with a global force like terrorism, the crux of
the challenge arises when the legislation, policies, and conceptions of
terrorism differ within cooperating States. The global threat of terrorism
compels each State to look beyond its own borders and national interests to
more fully comprehend and cooperate with the policies of other States.
Terrorism, as a global force, is confirming limitations on States' rights and
sovereignty. Unilateral policies are becoming increasingly rare and traditional
State-centered perceptions are being modified.
Part I of this Comment compares antiterrorism legislation in the United
States and the United Kingdom to exemplify the differences between just two
of the many countries involved in the international fight against terrorism.
Part II analyzes the global threat of terrorism under the analytical framework
of extradition and deportation schemes, accentuating the interplay between
domestic and international cooperation. Part III discusses the international
conventions and conferences adopted and the implications of these
multilateral antiterrorist efforts. Part IV focuses on police enforcement
agencies, primarily in the context of the European Union, and also addresses
the shift in the United States toward exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction of
its enforcement agencies. Part V reviews the obstacles surrounding the
enforcement of counterterrorist efforts. Part VI provides suggestions and
proposals for future international remedies. This author supports the creation
of an International Criminal Court, but offers changes to the proposed Court's
jurisdictional scheme.
I. LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES
A. Recent US. Legislation
In the early to mid-1990s, the United States continued to face the global
threat of terrorism. On March 4, 1994, four individuals were convicted for
13. L PAUL BREMER III, The West's Counter-Terrorist Strategy, in WESTERN RESPONSES TO
TERRORISM 255, 257 (Alex P. Schmid & Ronald D. Crelinsten, eds. 1993).
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bombing the World Trade Center in New York. In the first month of 1995, the
United States, in accordance with an executive order, froze the assets of
several terrorist groups. On February 7, 1995, Ramzi Ahmed Yousef was
arrested in Pakistan and returned to the United States for trial. April 12, 1995,
marked the extradition date of Abdul Hakeem, a defendant charged in the
Philippine air case, to the United States. Four months later, Ishmail Najim,
also a suspected world terrorist involved in the World Trade Center bombing,
was arrested in Jordan and relinquished to the United States. Sheik Rahman
was convicted in New York on October 1, 1995. During his sentencing, he
and his followers threatened retaliation against the United States. 4 These
terrorist activities and countless others served as the backdrop to the United
States' enactment of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA).15
The tragic bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in
Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995, focused the U.S. government's attention on
the need for new antiterrorist legislation. At the time of the bombing,
President Clinton's proposed antiterrorist legislation was pending before the
House. 6 Following the tragedy, both the House and the Senate scrambled to
introduce bills. On April 27, 1995, the Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention
Act of 1995 was introduced inthe Senate1 and passed on June 7, 1995.18 The
Comprehensive Anti-Terrorism Act of 1995' 9 was introduced in the House on
May 25, 1995; however, it was not until March 14, 1996, that the House
passed a revised version, the Effective Death Penalty and Public Safety Act
of 1996.0 Congress approved the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996," a conference bill resembling the House version, on April 17 and
18, 1996. President Clinton signed the bill into law on April 24, 1996.
The AEDPA is extensive, although not as sweeping as the President and
Congressional leaders originally intended. The legislation includes provisions
allotting one billion dollars over the next four years to numerous antiterrorism
14. See International Terrorism: Hearing Before the Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, 104th
Cong. (1996) [hereinafter Senate Hearing].
15. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
(1996) [hereinafter AEDPAJ.
16. See H.R. 896, 104th Cong. (1995).
17. S. 735, 104th Cong. (1995).
18. See 141 Cong. Rec. S7857 (daily ed. June 7, 1995).
19. H.R. 1710, 104th Cong. (1995).
20. See 141 Cong. Rev. H2304 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 1996).
21. See AEDPA, Pub. L No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
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programs,' requiring violators to make restitution to their victims,23 granting
immigration authorities heightened power to restrict entry into the United
States of persons belonging to organizations identified as terrorist
organizations by the State Department,24 increasing governmental powers to
deport foreigners convicted of crimes,25 and mandating that plastic explosives
contain chemical taggants for tracking purposes.26
Although these are substantial provisions, numerous initial proposals were
deleted from the legislation. The President initially requested an extension of
the statute of limitations for firearm violations, heightened governmental
access to suspected terrorists' credit reports and other records, increased
wiretapping abilities by the FBI of suspected terrorists' telephones, and
military involvement in cases including biological and chemical weapons,'
amongst other provisions.
Critics argue that "many of the substantive enhancements deleted from the
AEDPA would have been constitutional and were perhaps necessary to ensure
the legislation's effectiveness." The AEDPA and the controversy
surrounding it, however, point to the delicate balance that must be achieved
in the United States between the constitutional liberties of U.S. citizens and
the increased investigatory powers of the FBI when implementing antiterrorist
measures. For instance, the original House and Senate bills included
terrorism-related offenses for which the FBI could gain permission to intercept
wire and oral communications." The original House bill even expanded the
permissible uses of tracing devices to include foreign counterintelligence
22. See id. §§ 811-822.
23. See id. §§ 201-211.
24. See id. §§ 401-443.
25. See id.
26. See id. §§ 601-607.
27. See Roberta Smith, Note, America Tries to Come to Terms with Terrorism: The United States
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 v. British Anti-Terrorism Law and International
Responses, 5 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COME L 249,269 (1997).
28. Note, Blown Away? The Bill of Rights After Oklahoma City, 109 HARv. L REv. 2074, 2080
(1996). Whether or not the deleted legislative proposals were reasonable or constitutional is beyond the
scope of this Comment.
29. See H.R. 1710, 104 Cong. § 301(aX3) (1995) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (1994)); S. 735,
104 Cong. §512 (1995) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (1994)).
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searches.3" The AEDPA currently does not include provisions pertaining to
the FBI's surveillance power.' Additionally, the original House and Senate
bills provided an opportunity for the FBI to secure an ex parte order
instructing any common carrier, storage facility, public accommodation
facility, or vehicle rental service to produce records in its possession that
relate to a counterterrorism investigation. 2 The AEDPA contains no such
provisions.
While the majority of U.S. citizens agree that terrorism is a major concern,
there is no consensus in the United States regarding how the government
should meet this challenge. The AEDPA exemplifies the legislative
controversy regarding the balance the United States must strike between
granting heightened powers to the government for effective antiterrorist
responses and protecting the cherished, fundamental liberties, and civil rights
of U.S. citizens. In promulgating the AEDPA, U.S. legislators wrestled with
the appropriate scope of antiterrorist measures within its domestic context.
B. Britain's Anti-Terrorism Legislation
The bulk of antiterrorism legislation in the United Kingdom has been
primarily influenced by and directed at the ongoing struggle between the
Catholic and Protestant populations. 33 Among other provisions, the United
Kingdom Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1984 (Act
of 1984) proscribed the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Irish National
Liberation Army (INLA),' placed the powers of detention, arrest, and
exclusion in the hands of the Executive,35 designated that contributing to acts
of terrorists as a crime,' and provided the police with the authority to conduct
security checks on travelers.37
30. See H.R. 1710, 104 Cong. § 302 (1996).
31. See AEDPA, Pub. L No. 104-132, tit. HI (Apr. 24, 1996).
32. See S. 735, 104 Cong. § 502(a); accord MR. 1710, 104 Cong. § 304(a) (1996).
33. See Matthew IL James, Comment, Keeping the Peace-British, Israeli, and Japanese Legislative
Responses to Terrorism, 15 DICK. J. INT'L L. 405,416 (1997).
34. Smith, supra note 27, at 278.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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It was not until the following year, 1985, that telephone tapping became
illegal in the United Kingdom.38 "English law, unlike American law, drew no
distinction between electronic surveillance for ordinary criminal investigations
and law enforcement, on the one hand, and national security purposes on the
other, the latter being further subdivided into surveillance of domestic
activities and of foreign powers. All were treated alike."39 However, Britain
did not make telephone tapping illegal on its own accord. The European
Court of Human Rights4" did not look favorably upon the lenient British law
and announced its disapproval.4' In response, the British government enacted
the Interception of Communications Act of 1985, making telephone tapping
illegal.42
Like prior antiterrorism legislation, commentators highly criticized the Act
of 1984 for the large number of suspects detained year after year.4" The
European Court of Human Rights again expressed its disfavor with Britain's
antiterrorist legislation. The Court found the provision allowing individuals
to be detained for a potential seven-day period without a court appearance to
be a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights." Compared to
the high number of detentions, very few resulted in formal charges. 41
However, the British government did not amend its law this time. "The
government maintained that the seven-day period was essential and that the
sensitivity of the information on which detention was based rendered its
38. See Graham Zellick, Spies, Subversives, Terrorists and the British Government: Free Speech and
Other Casualties, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 773, 785 (1990).
39. Id. at 786.
40. See generally JAMES R. FoX, DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 99(1997)
(defining the Court as an "organ of the Council of Europe; the 34 Member States have accepted the
jurisdiction of this court which can issue binding rulings on whether a government has violated its
obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights").
41. See generally PETER WALLINGTON & JEREMY MCBRIDE, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND A BILL OF RIGHTS
44-80 (1976) (discussing the impact the European Court has on the legislative and judicial branches of
government in Britain).
42. See Smith, supra note 27, at 280.
43. The Prevention of Terrorism Bill was enacted in November of 1974 and many criticized it.
"[Wjhat is surprising-if not shocking---to the foreign observer in the light of English history in the
preceding century, is the alacrity with which the English surrendered practically the totality of their
cherished liberties to the discretion of government officials ... " BARTON L. INoRAHAM, POLITICAL CRIME
IN EUROPE 295 (1979), reprinted in DONNA M. SCHLAGHEC,, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 108 (1988).
44. Smith, supra note 27, at 278.
45. Between 1974 and 1986, 6246 persons were detained while only 515 were charged. See Zellick,
supra note 38, at 817.
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presentation to a court in the presence of the detainee impossible." 4' Britain
argued that it based its derogation on the "public emergency" exception,
despite concern that detention served merely as a mechanism for the British
government to harass it citizens. 7
In 1989, the United Kingdom promulgated the Prevention of Terrorism
(Temporary Provisions) Act (PTA).4 The PTA, basically a reincarnation of
the Act of 1984, banned any form of financial assistance to terrorists,49 gave
the Secretary of State the power to exclude persons suspected of terrorist
involvement without court review," and empowered police to arrest an
individual without a warrant if the officer reasonably suspected involvement
in acts of terrorism.'
A year and a half of peace between Northern Ireland and Britain ensued.
However, when the IRA renewed its bombing campaign, the British
government enacted the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act of 1996
(EPA),"2 which came into force on August 25, 1996.1 This piece of legislation
served as Britain's leading antiterrorist legislation until 1998, representing the
fifth emergency legislative act. In conjunction with prior legislation, the
EPA grants the police additional powers to search and arrest, proscribes ten
paramilitary organizations (in addition to the two organizations in the PTA),
and grants the Executive powers of detention. 5 The EPA also closely
monitors private security services located in Northern Ireland to prevent
potential terrorist infiltration of the private sector. "A constable is authorized
to enter any premises where a business involving the provision of security
services is operated and inspect employment records."'
46. Id. at 815.
47. Id. at 816 (citing European Convention on Human Rights, § 1, art 15(1)).
48. See Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989, cI. 4 (Eng.) [hereinafter PTA].
49. See id. §§ 9-13.
50. See id. §§ 5-6.
51. Seeid. §14(l)(b).
52. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1996, ch. 22 (Eng.) [hereinafter EPA].
53. See James, supra note 33, at 421.
54. See Smith, supra note 27, at 282.
55. See id. at 282-83; see also James, supra note 33, at 422-23.
56. James, supra note 33, at 423.
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Most recently, Britain has enacted the Criminal Justice (Terrorism and
Conspiracy) Act of 1998 (Terrorism and Conspiracy Act).57 The Terrorism
and Conspiracy Act was published in draft form on September 1, 1998, and
debated in the House of Commons and the House of Lords until September 4,
1998. The Act received royal assent and came into force on September 4,
1998. This legislation is significant for several reasons. First, the Terrorism
and Conspiracy Act makes it easier to secure the conviction of those who are
members of proscribed organizations." Membership in a prohibited
organization has been illegal for years under the PTA, but it has been difficult
to prosecute for membership alone. Further, the Terrorism and Conspiracy
Act makes it an offense to conspire in the United Kingdom to commit a crime
in another country, provided the act carried out would be an offense both in
the United Kingdom and the country where the offense occurs.59  Upon
conviction, the assets of individuals found to be members of a terrorist group
would be subject to forfeiture if they were used in support of that group.'
Britain's Home Secretary, Jack Straw, recently announced, "In the last 25
years terrorism has exacted a terrible toll. This is not just the result of Irish
terrorism. In the last 20 years there have been more than 80 international
terrorist incidents in this country." 6 As a result, he expressed an intention to
replace the current temporary PTA and EPA with permanent United Kingdom-
wide counterterrorism legislation, possibly as early as 1999.62
C. Comparison of US. and British Legislation
The contrast between the United States and British antiterrorist legislation
represents the stark dichotomy between the legislative responses to terrorism
in only two countries.63 Clearly, international cooperation involves many
57. Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act, 1998, ch. 40 (Eng.).
58. See id. § 3.
59. See id. § 5.
60. See id. § 4(3).
61. Britain in the USA, British GovernmentAnnounces Reform ofCounter Terrorism Legislation and
Revocation of Exclusion Orders (visited Jan. 4, 1999) <http://www.britain-
info.org/bis/nireland/straw.htm>.
62. Id.
63. State responses to curbing terrorism have ranged from legislation, reprisals, adjudication,
extraterritorial jurisdiction, and even political compromise. Over the years, the United States alone has
responded in varied capacities. Though the legislation between the United States and the United Kingdom
are markedly different and are at issue here, the wide gamut of other responses by both countries further
complicates the mix.
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cooperating States; these are only two links in the international chain.
Therefore, even a comparison of two Western democratic nations illustrates
key distinctions.
In the United States, the basic separation of powers principle is
fundamental. However, in Britain there are important structural distinctions.
The chief points of difference between the two nations
are... the absence of a supreme constitution and hence of an
entrenched bill of rights, the absence of constitutional
adherence to the separation of powers and the accepted
merger of executive and legislative functions, the absence of
a federal system of government, and the absence of a power
of judicial review of primary legislation."
These differing frameworks significantly affect the breadth of legislation
and the powers afforded to governmental officials. "British law grants more
power to its government to control terrorism through formalized anti-terrorism
legislation than does American law.' 5 Yet, despite the absence of a national
constitution or formal bill of rights, the European Court of Human Rights
repeatedly pressures the British government, though not always successfully,
to confront the civil liberties and rights of British citizens."
Further, the British government has continually passed specific
antiterrorism legislation while the United States, on the other hand, has
typically assimilated antiterrorism measures into other laws.67 Perhaps the
AEDPA indicates a change and represents U.S. legislation geared toward
terrorism. Whether additional antiterrorism legislation in the United States
will follow depends on future decisions Congress and the President will make
after weighing the need for additional antiterrorism legislation against the
64. D.G.T. Williams, Aspects of EqualProtection in the UnitedKingdom, 59 TUL L REV. 959,959-
60(1985).
65. Smith, supra note 27, at 283.
66. Id.; see also Williams, supra note 64, at 965 (stating that British judges are increasingly aware
of rulings from the European Court of Human Rights).
67. On September 2, 1998, the British House of Commons gave overwhelming approval, by a vote
of 391-17, in favor of legislation that would provide for swift arrests of individuals involved in acts of
violence in Northem Ireland. Ray Mosley, Britain Advances Terror Bill Tough Law Likely to Pass, Set Up
Ulster Bomb Arrests, CI TRiB., Sept 3, 1998, §1, at6.
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cherished principles of civil liberties and rights." For example, the original
proposed legislation was more comprehensive than the bill which was signed
into law. President Clinton endorsed warrantless wiretapping; however, this
proposal did not pass the balancing test. As a result, the constitutional rights
of U.S. citizens to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures prevailed. 9
Antiterrorism legislation not only affects a particular country's domestic
context, but the international community as well. The balance between
broadly fashioned legislative initiatives, providing more effective deterrence
of terrorist activities, and narrowly tailored ones providing increased
protection of individual liberties, is paradoxical. A review of antiterrorist
legislation in the United States and the United Kingdom indicates the dilemma
of combating terrorism on the domestic front. On the international level,
interconnecting numerous countries with varying conceptions of how to curb
the global threat of terrorism becomes an increasingly complicated challenge.
II. EXTRADITION AND DEPORTATION SCHEMES
Extradition and deportation schemes provide a suitable analytical
framework with which international cooperation in the fight against terrorism
can be assessed. Lack of uniformity in these areas creates stumbling blocks
to internationalized efforts. The global force of terrorism pushes States to
harmonize, at least to a greater extent, their legal responses. Otherwise,
terrorists might continue to benefit from disjointed international efforts.
Extradition is defined as "[tjhe surrender by one state or country to
another of an individual accused or convicted of an offense outside its own
territory and within the territorial jurisdiction of the other, which, being
competent to try and punish him, demands the surrender." 0 Extradition,
unsurprisingly, is a mainstay in the area of international cooperation involving
terrorism.
68. Smith, supra note 27, at 274-76. In August of 1996, the House of Representatives voted in favor
of the Aviation Security and Anti-Terrorism Act, which would increase counter-terrorist measures.
However, the National Rifle Association ("NRA") and American Civil liberties Union ("ACLU")
vigorously objected to provisions allowing wiretapping and taggants on explosives, and these were deleted
from the bill. Id at 274-75.
69. See id.
70. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 585 (6th ed. 1990); see also MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 422 (1991) (defining extradition as the process by which one jurisdiction turns over a suspected or
convicted criminal to another jurisdiction); RESTATEmENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 402 (1987).
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In extradition jurisprudence, much controversy has surrounded the
"political offense exception." Persons accused of terrorism often argue that
they are engaged in political activities, and, as such, are not to be extradited
according to the "political offense exception."'" Lack of consistency between
treaties in defining a "political offense" further complicates the issue.' Since
international law does not obligate States to extradite, treaties establish this
duty." Confronted with this "escape hatch" for terrorists, governments have
begun to alter the category of extraditable offenses.74 For example, the
Supplementary Extradition Treaty of 1985 between the United States and the
United Kingdom" excluded a number of offenses from the "political offense
exception,"76 regardless of the fact that some were, in reality, political. The
list of excluded offenses includes politically motivated crimes of murder,
kidnaping, hostage-taking, and the making of explosives."7
Recently, two notable trends have occurred in the European Union's
extradition jurisprudence.' First, extradition procedures have become more
liberal and flexible. Presently, treaties allow extradition for any serious
offense, whereas the previous list of extraditable offenses was more limited.
This shift implies that the "political offense exception," traditionally based on
the concept of State sovereignty, has lost significance." Second, as a by-
product of increased international cooperation, extradition procedures and
71. See R. Stuart Phillips, The Political Offence Exception and Terrorism: Its Place in the Current
Extradition Scheme and Proposals for Its Future, 15 DIcK. J. INT'L. L 337, 341 (1997).
72. Smith, supra note 27, at 253.
73. Phillips, supra note 71, at 338. Extradition, therefore, should be viewed as an imperfect
obligation, only having the force of international law when there is an agreement committing the parties
to extradite. See generally LAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 315 (4th ed. 1990)
(stating "[w~ith the exception of alleged crimes under international law, in the absence of treaty, surrender
of an alleged criminal cannot be demanded as of right").
74. See G. Vermeulen & T. Vander Beken, New Conventions on Extradition in the European Union:
Analysis and Evaluation, 15 DICK. J. INT'L 1 265, 266 (1997); Sandra LM. Gosser, In Re Requested
Extradition ofArt, Brennan, and Kirby: Counterterrorism and the Court, 6 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L 633,
635 (1998).
75. Supplemental Treaty Concerning the Extradition Treaty Between the Govermnent of the United
States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, June
25, 1985, 24 LLM. 1105.
76. Phillips, supra note 71, at 352 (stating this change was in response to the IRA's invocation of the
political exception doctrine).
77. Smith, supra note 27, at 253.
78. Vermeulen & Vander Beken, supra note 74, at 266.
79. Id.
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requirements are less complex and rigid.'4 Expanding the reach of extradition
laws might create new complications, potentially decreasing trust between
States or threatening State sovereignty. However, increased simplification of
extradition procedures also creates a risk of inadequate legal protection for
individuals suspected of terrorist involvement, potentially infringing an
individual's civil liberties."
Traditionally, the "political offense exception" has served many
objectives: to avoid one country taking sides in the internal affhirs of another
country; to protect the political offender from a potentially impartial trial; and
to recognize that political dissent may be legitimate. However, the ongoing
struggle to define "political offense" creates unnecessary confusion and
hinders international cooperation in the extradition of terrorists. Political
offenses are often categorized as either "pure" political offenses or "relative"
political offenses.' There is general agreement in the international
community that "pure" political offenses are those directed exclusively at the
State and, as such, merit the exception. However, the "relative" political
offense category creates a gray area that presents serious uniformity problems.
Relative political offenses are those which have a "hybrid nature" and are
handled differently between States. Great Britain and the United States
demand the crime be "incidental to and form part of political disturbances."4
Courts in Switzerland, on the other hand, selected a "predominant motive" or
"proportionality" test.85 This more restrictive approach demands that the
crime not only involve a political agenda, but also that the crime must have
been necessary to satisfy the proportionality prong. Therefore, the political
nature of the criminal offense must exceed components of a common crime.
In contrast, France balances the perpetrator's motive against the egregiousness
of the crime. The more serious the crime, the greater the need for
extradition.'
The death penalty further complicates extradition jurisprudence. Even
when there is an extradition treaty, nations may deny extradition if the treaty
allows refusal based on the death penalty. In 1989, the United States was
80. Id.
81. Id. al 266-67.
82. Phillips, supra note 71, at 341.
83. Id. at 341-43.
84. Id. at 343 (quoting In re Castoni, 1 Q.B. 149, 166 (1891)).
85. Id. at 346.
86. See id. at 348.
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operating under twenty extradition treaties which held that the other nation
could deny extradition if there was a possibility the suspect would face the
death penalty in the United StatesY One of those countries was the United
Kingdom. In that same year, the European Court of Human Rights decided a
pivotal case in international law pertaining to extradition. In Soering v. United
Kingdom," a young German man, Jens Soering, fled from the United States
after he and his girlfriend murdered her parents in Virginia. The couple fled
to England, where they were later arrested." While his girlfriend negotiated
with prosecutors, Mr. Soering vigorously opposed extradition to the United
States. Pursuant to the Extradition Treaty of 1972," the British government
required assurances that the death penalty would not be sought.9' Mr. Soering
argued that his possible punishment, if extradited, would constitute degrading
and inhuman treatment. The court agreed with Mr. Soering that the United
Kingdom had a duty to protect him from the possibility of waiting six to eight
years for execution.' After considering the options available, the court
decided to extradite Mr. Soering to his homeland of Germany for prosecution
where there would be no threat of the death penalty.93
Although the Soenng case did not involve terrorist activities, it amply
illustrates another gaping hole in extradition law. The same problem would
pertain when a nation has a terrorist within its borders and refuses to extradite
the individual because it knows the law permits the imposition of the death
penalty. A refusal to extradite would frustrate apprehending terrorists for
prosecution. There is an intense debate between those who believe the death
penalty sends a powerful message to terrorists and serves to deter future acts94
and those who want to abolish it.
Similarly, deportation laws require international cooperation among
States. A suspected terrorist's removal from one country potentially affects
the deportee's country. In this modem age of advanced technology,
87. 135 CONo. REc. 26, 128 (1989).
88. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. CL H.R. (ser. A) (1989), reprinted in 28 LL.M. 1063
(1989); see also RICHARD B. LILCH & HURsT HANNuM, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 724-60 (1995).
89. Soaring v. United Kingdom, 28 LLM. at 1072.
90. Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1972, U.S.-U.K., 28 U.S.T. 227 (entered into force Jan. 21, 1977).
91. Soering v. United Kingdom, 28 LLM. at 1073.
92. Soaring v. United Kingdom, 28 LLM. at 1093-1101.
93. Soaring v. United Kingdom, 28 LLM. at 1100. However, after reassurances from the United
States that no capital murder charges would be imposed, Mr. Soering was eventually extradited in 1991 to
the United States.
94. 135 CONG. REC. 26, 142 (statement of Sen. D'Amato).
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communication, and transportation, deporting a terrorist might serve to
remove the threat from one State only to increase the threat in the receiving
State.
In the United States, the recently enacted AEDPA provides for deportation
of suspected terrorists under proceedings in which the accused is denied
privileges to review classified evidence. "While the provision makes it much
quicker to remove undocumented aliens from the United States, the thousands
of foreigners who illegally entered the United States face removal from the
country without judicial review."' Prior to the AEDPA, aliens convicted of
crimes, resulting in the possibility of deportation, had the opportunity to
petition federal circuit courts. In response to the petition, if the judge found
that government officials had incorrectly decided to deport the petitioner, then
the case could be remanded. The AEDPA prohibits particular alien felons
from this petition process.'
The AEDPA targets aliens who have committed particularly serious
crimes and eliminates those individuals from deportation exemptions.' This
change in the handling of suspected terrorists by the United States not only
alters its domestic context, but also affects the deportee's country. "Recent
changes in U.S. law that encourage the deportation of persons convicted of
serious crimes is having repercussions in the deportees' native countries. '
For example, in response to an influx of violent crimes and other crime-related
problems, Caribbean nations are asking the United States to evaluate its
deportation system.9 Thus, the ramifications of deportation are not only
domestic, but also international.
95. Smith, supra note 27, at 270.
96. See Keith Donohue, Deportation Battle Brews; Immigration Bar Claims New Fast-Track Rules
for Removing Aliens Convicted ofCrimesAre Unconstitutional, RECORDER, May 30, 1996, at 1; Legal
Immigrants Face Deportation UnderAntiterrorism Act's Provisions, WEST'S LEGAL NEWS, July 18, 1996,
available in 1996 WL 399703. See generally Lisa C. Solbakken, The Anti-Terrorism andEffective Death
PenaltyAct: Anti-Immigration Legislation Veiled in an Anti-Terrorism Pretext, 63 BROOK. L REV. 1381
(1997).
97. See Smith, supra note 27, at 271.
98. Changes in U.S. Deportation LawlncreaseBurden on Other Countries, WEST LEGAL NEWS, Oct.
15, 1996, available in 1996 WL 587093.
99. See id.
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III. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES
A. Antiterrorist Conventions
The global force of terrorism increasingly offers incentives to States to
consensually surrender bits of their sovereignty through treaties in order to
fashion advantageous arrangements. For example, the international
community has adopted a host of multilateral antiterrorist conventions."re The
goal of these conventions is to create a framework for international
cooperation to combat acts of international terrorism.'' In accordance with
those aims, the New York Convention,"° for instance, mandates cooperation
in preventing attacks on diplomats both inside and outside their territories,
open exchange of information regarding the circumstances of the crime and
the alleged suspect's identity, and coordination of administrative efforts
against such attacks. The State possessing the alleged offender has an
obligation to take measures to extradite or prosecute the individual, and to
notify interested States and international organizations of any action taken.
100. Terrorist acts include aircraft hijacking, unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation,
unlawful acts against internationally protected persons (diplomats), taking of hostages, and the theft of
nuclear materials. Eight major multilateral conventions are regarded "antiterrorist": Convention on
Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Airraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704
U.N.T.S. 219 [hereinafter Tokyo Convention]; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 177 [hereinafter Hague Convention]; Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565,
974 U.N.T.S. 177 [hereinafter Montreal Convention]; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of
Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, Feb. 24, 1988, 27 I.L.MI 627 [hereinafter
Montreal Protocol]; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167
[hereinafter New York Convention]; International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17,
1979, T.I.A.S. No. 11081 [hereinafter Hostages Convention]; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, S. Treaty Doec. No. 1, 101st Cong., 1st
Seas. (1989), 27 LL.M. 672 [hereinafter IMO Convention]; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, Mar. 10, 1988, S. Treaty Doc. No.
1 (1989), 27 I.LM. 672, 685 [hereinafter IMO Protocol].
101. See Caleb M. Pilgrim, Terrorism in National and International Law, 8 DICK. J. INT'L L. 147,
193 (1990).
102. See New York Convention, supra note 100, at art. 4.
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Further, State parties are to submit all relevant evidence to assist in
appropriate criminal proceedings."'3
Likewise, the Hostages Convention"' requires States to either extradite or
prosecute any person involved in a terrorist offense. This Convention's
"effectiveness, however, was greatly weakened by a number of exceptions that
enabled States to avoid extradition or prosecution.'1 5 Additionally, the
Hostages Convention provides States with the opportunity to renounce the
Convention by written notification and fails to grant procedures for dealing
with recalcitrant States."' 6
The Tokyo Convention" 7 criminalizes offenses committed by an
individual on board any aircraft registered in a contracting State even when
the aircraft is in flight outside the borders of that State.'s 'The Tokyo
Convention [only] mentions acts ofinterference, seizure of, or other wrongful
exercise of control of an aircraft" to describe what constitutes a hijacking.""
Similarly, the Hague Convention"" fails to provide a clear definition of
hijacking. For example, the Hague Convention refers to the use of physical
force, threat, or intimidation to take control of an aircraft as elements of
hijacking."' Although the Montreal Convention"2 also lacks definitive terms
regarding the offense of hijacking, it did. broaden the occasions wherein the
offense could take place. For example, a hijacking occurs even if the doors
of the aircraft are not closed and the offender is not personally present."'
After three separate conventions, no precise definition of hijacking has
evolved. "The failure of all attempts at identifying the offence of hijacking
103. See Pilgrim, supra note 101, at 193.
104. See Hostages Convention, supra note 100, at art. 8.
105. William Mi. Cianaris, The New World Order and the Needfor an International Criminal Court,
16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 88, 97 (1992). See Hostages Convention, supra note 100, at art. 9 (providing
exceptions if a State believed the extradition request served the purpose of prosecuting or punishing an
individual on account of race, religion, or nationality).
106. See id.
107. See Tokyo Convention, supra note 100, at art. 11.
108. Id. atch. l, art 1(2).
109. R.LR. Abeyratne, The Effects of Unlawful nterference with CivilAviation on World Peace and
the Social Order, 22 TRANSP. L. 449, 475 (1995) (emphasis added).
110. See Hague Convention, supra note 100, at art. 1.
S11. See Abeyratne, supra note 109, at 475.
112. See generally Montreal Convention, supra note 100.
113. See Abeyratne, supra note 109, at 476.
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and formulating a cogent system of preventive criteria attains its culmination
in political terrorist acts.""' 4
These conventions establish certain obligations upon signatories to
cooperate. However, these obligations are challenging to fulfill due to
unfriendly States; States with differing legal systems, such as common law
versus civil law systems; or States' varying interpretations of the "political
offense exception" or the definition of hijacking."5  Additionally, the
"enforcement mechanisms are absent or very weak, as demonstrated by
Uganda's assistance to hijackers in the 1976 Entebbe episode, despite that
nation's ratification of the conventions.""1l6 Although Uganda offered aid to
the hijackers, Uganda never received punishment or censure."7
Criticisms of these multilateral conventions abound. The international
community has unsuccessfully entered into effective antiterrorist treaties for
two reasons: "the aura of ambiguity that shrouds the nature and force of an
international agreement" and "the lack of enthusiasm on the part of most
States to label terrorism as an offense against humanity."" 8 A further criticism
is that there are large gaps in the area of prevention: no guarantee of the
offender's trial is included, no duty binds contracting States to extradite the
offender, and no common standards of precaution or safety are contained
within the agreements." 9
B. International Conferences
More recently, international conferences highlight the issue of global
terrorism. The G-7, which includes Canada, the United States, Britain,
Germany, France, Italy, and Japan, have repeatedly discussed the issue of
terrorism.2 ' In June of 1995, the G-7 Summit leaders agreed to strengthen
international cooperation and efforts to combat international terronsm. The
next year, terrorism remained a priority following the bombing of the United
States military installation in Saudi Arabia and the IRA bombing in England.
114. Id.
115. See Pilgrim, supra note 101, at 194.
116. SCHLAGHECK, supra note 43, at 125.
117. See id.
118. Abeyratne, supra note 109, at 471.
119. See id. at 487-88.
120. See Clay Chandler & John F. Harris, Serbia Threatened With New Sanctions: World Leaders
Demand Bosnian Serbs Resign, WASH. PosT, June 30, 1996, at Al8.
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These leaders then issued a Declaration on Terrorism."I They met in Paris a
month later at the Ministerial Conference on Terrorism to discuss feasible
antiterrorist measures. On July 30, 1996, at the Ministerial Conference on
Terrorism, the G-7 leaders and Russian leaders adopted twenty-five practical
antiterrorism resolutions. This plan included increasing public transportation
security measures, implementing global standards for detecting bombs,
tightening border controls, policing the Internet, improving exchange of
intelligence information, and drafting a treaty compelling countries to
prosecute or extradite suspected bombers.'
Although the G-7 gives terrorism considerable attention and continually
places it on its agenda, in reality, the result is not much more than a general
condemnation of terrorism, accompanied by additional pledges to cooperate
in combating terrorism." The Bonn Declaration, 24 for example, bound
signatories to halt bilateral air traffic with countries which declined to
extradite or punish hijackers or refused to return aircraft and passengers.
However, the only time the countries invoked the Bonn Declaration was in
1982 when West Germany, France, and Britain cut off all air transportation
with Afghanistan.' 25
Additionally, the agreement regarding the G-7 leaders' adoption of certain
practical measures has not gone uncriticized on the domestic front. In the
United States, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) declared its
opposition to the twenty-five point proposal. The Global Internet Liberty
Campaign, a coalition including the ACLU, voiced its objections to
government regulation of the Internet since there are no borders in cyberspace.
It argued that the U.S. government cannot be permitted to limit dissemination
of information or to gain access to coded communications through
international avenues when Congress and the courts have not extended such
121. G7 Leaders Meet in Lyon, FOREIGN POL'Y BuLL., Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 9.
122. See Victoria Meyerov, The Buck Stops Here: Illinois Criminalizes Support for International
Terrorism, 30 J. MARSHALL L REV. 871,883 (1997); Smith, supra note 27, at 286-87; Philip Johnston, G7
Nations Plan FightAgainst Terror Groups, DAILY TELEGRAPH, July 31, 1996, at 10.
123. See Smith, supra note 27, at 286.
124. Joint Statement on International Terrorism, July 17, 1978, 17 LLM. 1285 [hereinafter Bonn
Declaration].
125. See Pilgrim, supra note 101, at 198.
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authority.' Again, the United States' struggle to participate in international
agreements to effectively combat the global threat of terrorism gives rise to the
delicate balance between increased governmental intervention for protection
purposes and citizens' liberties.
At the 1995 World Summit for Social Development, 117 national leaders
gathered together to address global problems such as terrorism, drug
trafficking, and human rights violations. These leaders labeled such problems
as urgent and compelling. 27 Additionally, in October 1997, Japan and the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) held a conference to
discuss measures to combat terrorism, following the aftermath of the hostage
crisis at the Japanese Ambassador's official residence in Peru. The crisis
lasted four months until Peruvian troops stormed Ambassador Aoki's home,
killing the fourteen hostage-takers while releasing all but one of the seventy-
two hostages.' Japan's Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto stated, "I expect
Japan and ASEAN to further strengthen cooperation in the fight against
abhorrent terrorism."'29  The World Summit and ASEAN conference
demonstrate two more international conferences aimed at curtailing terrorism.
These conferences continue to provide a forum for States to condemn
terrorism, yet unified and synthesized effective antiterrorist measures seldom
follow. The global threat of terrorism mandates more; implementation of
these proposals is the next step required.
IV. POLICE COOPERATION
A. Interpol
Police agencies throughout the world have played a vital role in the fight
against terrorism. However, notions of State sovereignty have resulted in a
heavy reliance on domestic forces and have consequently served as a barrier
to more integrated international enforcement agencies. The global force of
terrorism is pressuring police agencies to further harmonize their resources
and support systems.
126. See Smith, supra note 27, at 289.
127. See Annan, supra note 7, at 3.
128. See Japan ASEAN to Hold Antiterrorism Forum Next Week, JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE, OCt 2,
1997, available in 10/2/97 JWIRE 04:24:00.
129. Japan's Hashimoto Urges ASEANMembers to Fight Terrorism, DOW JoNEs NEws SERv., Oct.
7, 1997, available in 10/7/97 DJNS 04:53:00.
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The International Police Organization (Interpol) is a formalized
association of police throughout the world, facilitating the sharing of
information and fostering international comity. Interpol "represents the height
of multilateral police cooperation, significantly encouraging the
internationalization of law enforcement and advancing away from the
unpredictability of ad hoc police cooperation."" Each Member State in
Interpol creates a National Central Bureau (NCB) to serve as a liaison with
other countries. Each NCB has three specific duties: to openly communicate
with police agencies in its own country; to keep channels of communication
open with other NCBs; and to provide necessary and appropriate
communication with the Interpol General Secretariat.' The goal, therefore,
is to effectuate a more efficient response to transnational crimes like terrorism.
Prior to resolutions passed in 1984, Interpol lacked the authority to
intervene in cases of religious, racial, or political character. "[B]y removing
the political ramifications of several crimes regarded as terrorist,"'32 the range
of Interpol's antiterrorist involvement expanded. Despite this change, Interpol
continues to serve primarily in the limited capacity of a communication
network system to assist local law enforcement in locating terrorists.
B. Europol
The development of an integrated financial market within the European
Union (EU) included the elimination of border controls between Member
States. 33 As a result of this single financial market, economic unity, and the
free movement of services and funds, new opportunities for illegal activity
arose." EU Member States quickly recognized the need for international
police cooperation to control illegal transnational activities.'35 Member States
established the European Police Office (Europol), the embryonic Europe-wide
police agency, to improve cooperation among Member States' authorities in
130. Barry Keliman & David S. Gualtieri, Barricading the Nuclear Window-A Legal Regime to
Curtail Nuclear Smuggling, 19 U. ILL. L REv. 667, 720 (1996).
131. Seeid. at721.
132. Id.
133. See Monaco, supra note 12, at 247.
134. See id. at 248.
135. Scott Carlson & Bruce Zagaris, International Cooperation in Criminal Matters: Western
Europe's InternationalApproach to International Crime, 15 NoVAL REv. 551, 552-53 (1991).
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their efforts to prevent increasing money laundering, drug trafficking,
terrorism, and other serious transnational crimes. 36
In many ways, Europol resembles Interpol, set within the context of the
EU. 'The primary function of Europol is to gather and analyze information
held by the different national police forces.""13  Beyond that designated
function, Member States lack a unified view on how far Europol's authority
should extend. Since its formation, the EU has attempted to collectively act
as one powerful unit, but the issue of national sovereignty serves as a
barrier.'"
The designated role of Europol illustrates this tension. For example,
Germany desired the placement of nuclear smuggling within Europol's
authority, and Spanish leaders thought Europol should be empowered with
significant counter-terrorism intelligence sharing responsibilities. France and
the United Kingdom, on the other hand, believed that Europol should have a
diminished role to play and remain clearly subordinate to the control of
national governments.139
Even those in favor of Europol do not fail to overlook the impediments to
police enforcement. Law enforcement confronts two large hurdles: tension
between a State's multiple branches of government and the delicate balance
between the government's need to investigate and the realm of citizens'
protected civil liberties."4
Yet, the nature of transnational crimes, like terrorism, pressures
cooperating States to overcome these obstacles. The creation of Europol
marks a move in the right direction and a recognition of the mobility and
resourcefulness of these nonterritorial actors.
Global interdependence, however, is a defining characteristic
of the modem world, and increasingly, criminal activity does
not recognize national boundaries. Crime often arises in the
context of international networks, operating beyond the
control of any single sovereign nation. In addition to the
136. See Council Act of 26 July 1995 Drawing up the Convention Based on Article K.3 of the Treaty
on European Union on the Establishment of a European Police Office (Europol Convention), 1995 O.J.
C316/2.
137. Joel S. Solomon, Comment, Forming a More Secure Union: The Growing Problem of
Organized Crime in Europe as a Challenge to National Sovereignty, 13 DICK. J. INT'L L 623, 645 (1995).
138. See id. at 646.
139. See Kellman & Gualtieri supra note 130, at 722 n.226.
140. See Monaco, supra note 12, at 253.
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problems encountered in domestic law enforcement,
international law enforcement must overcome problems that
stem from issues of sovereignty, conflicting legal systems,
and political conflict between governments. 4'
One commentator, in response to the function of police enforcement
within the European Union, focused not only on the age-old issue of State
sovereignty, but also on the global nature of crimes like terrorism:
Politicians-usually least likely to admit an erosion of state
sovereignty-have encouraged this shift by repeatedly
stressing the growing impact of transfrontier crime. The
admission that international crime establishes a genuine
threat to the internal security of EU Member States has
forced them to acknowledge the limitations of national law
enforcement policies. European police cooperation, and
particularly also the activities of Europol, is beginning to be
based on the principle of subsidiarity: criminal activities that
cannot be effectively combated at a local, regional or national
level as a result of inadequate resources may increasingly
become [the] subject of concerted international police
cooperation."
The future of Europol, and other enforcement agencies, depends on how
States envision their role in the global fight against terrorism. Notions of State
sovereignty currently undermine Europol's authority. "Although there are
obvious concerns relating to the centralization of a police force, such as
leakage of classified national security information and abdication of control
over national protection, such risks are necessary to establish an organized
force to thwart organized crime."'43  Unless international efforts are
synthesized to a greater extent, the global threat of terrorism will continue to
mount.
141. Id. at 253-54.
142. Monica den Boer, Paper Presented at Cyprus Police Academy Seminar 3 (Dec. 1994), reprinted
in Monaco, supra note 12, at 255.
143. Solomon, supra note 137, at 646-47.
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C. United States Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
On the United States' front, a shift has also occurred. Due to the global
nature of terrorism, States rely less frequently on exclusively unilateral
policies toward terrorism. Reliance on international cooperation has become
critical. In recognition of the shortcomings, or at least limitations, of a
unilateral policy, the United States moved toward exercising extraterritorial
jurisdiction.'" Accordingly, the Omnibus Anti-Terrorism Bill of 1986
empowered U.S. domestic law enforcement agencies, particularly the FBI, by
giving them heightened authority to act overseas when the crimes involved
U.S. citizens."
"Recognizing that activities which occurred wholly outside its country's
borders could at times have a substantial domestic impact,"'" the United
States increased its enforcement powers abroad. Since the enactment of the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 and the Omnibus Diplomatic
Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986, the United States FBI has
responded, for example, to "207 incidents, 105 of which are in South
America."'47 Clearly, the success of U.S. efforts abroad relies not only upon
coordination with the Department of State, but also upon the permission and
cooperation of the host country. 'I
Two factors in deciding the level to which the United States can and
should extend its authority to other countries are the degree of harm that might
develop and the degree to which other States might be able to prevent the
threat from occurring.'" If grave danger will ensue and it looks as though
other countries will not react, then "the United States has a moral obligation,
which should form the basis for a legal obligation, to prevent this serious harm
144. See Martha Crenshaw, Unintended Consequences: HowDemocracies Respond to Terrorism,
21 FLETcHER F. WORLD AFF. 153, 155 (1997).
145. See id In addition to the global crime of terrorismn, "[cihanges in the world economic system
... soon brought about a selectively different reading of the scope of U.S. law." Mark P. Gibney, The
Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law: The Perversion of Democratic Governance, the Reversal of
Institutional Roles, and the Imperative of Establishing Normative Principles, 19 B. C. INT'L & COM. L.
REv. 297, 297-98 (1996).
146. Gibney, supra note 145, at298.
147. Hearing Before the Committee on International Terrorism in Latin America, 104th Cong. 8
(1995).
148. See id.
149. See Gibney, supra note 145, at 320.
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from occurring."' ' In this way, tackling the global threat of terrorism is
portrayed as serving some interest beyond the national level. This raises the
level of response to terrorist acts to a higher level: protection of "humankind"
or the "common good." This synthesis of cooperating States' efforts is
increasingly important in crippling the global threat of terrorism.1
V. OBSTACLES
A. Varying Definitions
One of the obstacles surrounding the enforcement of antiterrorist measures
is the lack of a set definition of terrorism. "Numerous definitions of terrorism
have circulated, many of which are overinclusive or mutually inconsistent.""'
States agree that terrorism mandates effective responses and that terrorist acts
are becoming increasingly violent. However, agreement fails when it comes
to identifying "terrorism" and who should be classified as a "terrorist."''5
A quick glance at a handful of "terrorist" definitions illustrates the
variance. 'The term 'terrorism' means premeditated, politically motivated
violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or
clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience."" The AEDPA
references the Immigration and Nationality Act's (INA) provisions on terrorist
activity instead of defining it."5 Since the AEDPA's definition covers only
150. Id.
151. See generally ETHAN A. NADELMANN, COPS ACROSS BORDERS: THE INrERNATIONALIZATION
OF U.S. CRIMINAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 1 (1993). Exhaustive research has been conducted regarding
international law enforcement activities of the United States. Ethan A. Nadelmann has examined the
evolutionary process of multilateral law enforcement agencies. This process denotes law enforcement
agencies working together to reduce the tensions generated by conflicting legal systems and political
tensions. Nadelmann describes this harmonization as a regularization of relations among law enforcement
agencies in various States and a homogenization of systems with a common norm. Nadelmann does
recommend, however, additional research of this harmonization process is necessary to achieve more
effective relationships between governments and international organizations. See generally id.
152. BlownAway, supra note 28, at 2086.
153. See Smith, supra note 27, at 249.
154. BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 6 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE DISPATCH
395, 396 (1995). Since 1983, the United States Government has used this definition for statistical analysis.
Id.
155. AEDPA, supra note 15, § 40 1(a).
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violent activities, federal agencies have relied on their own definitions.'"6 The
Oxford English Dictionary describes "terrorism" as "[a] policy intended to
strike with terror those against whom it is adopted; the employment of
methods of intimidation; the fact of terrorizing or condition of being
terrorized.""' 7 The PTA defines terrorism as "the use of violence for political
ends, and includes any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or
any section of the public in fear."'"
The struggle to clearly define terrorism creates an obstacle to reaching
international agreements on terrorism. Trying to distinguish, for instance,
terrorist activity from legitimate activities of national liberation movements
becomes complex. The old clich6, "[o]ne man's terrorist is another man's
freedom fighter,"" presents clear cultural and ideological differences.
In addition to the countless definitions of terrorism, two dissimilar
"terrorist" paradigms exist, further muddying the waters. One paradigm
portrays terrorism as a species of military war. Deterrence becomes the key
to combating this type of terrorism. The other paradigm portrays terrorism as
a criminal offense.'" Here terrorism becomes a concern of law enforcement.
The focus switches from deterrence to emphasis on the government's task of
apprehending and punishing terrorists. 6" The two paradigms not only view
terrorism quite distinctly, but also conceptualize the response to terrorism in
differing manners.
To avoid definitional inconsistencies, some argue that a particular
definition need not shape a State's counteraction policy. As a result of this
global trend, the general repulsion States share toward terrorist violence
should instead be the guide. The common thread of wanting to eradicate
terrorism should suffice. 62 Nonetheless, current definitional inconsistencies
serve as a distraction for unified international responses to effectively counter
global terrorism.
156. See Louis R. Beres, The Meaning of Terrorism-Jurisprudential and Definitional
Clarifications, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L 239, 240-41 (1995) (discussing the varying definitions among
federal agencies).
157. TH OXFoRD ENOuISH DIcTIONARY 821 (2d ed. 1989).
158. See PTA, supra note 48, § 20(1).
159. SEAN ANDERSON & STEPHEN SLOAN, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF TERRORISM 1 (1995).
160. See Smith, supra note 27, at 254.
161. Id.
162. See James, supra note 33, at 406-07 (comparing legislative antiterrorist initiatives of the United
Kingdom, Israel and Japan even though Japan and Israel have not adopted a precise statutory definition of
teorism).
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B. Modern Day Context
In response to the United States' effort to "stretch the long arm of the
law,"'63 some U.S. politicians suggested that the money spent on antiterrorist
efforts abroad might be more wisely allocated on domestic responses.
However, "there's just one problem: When you're talking about today's
border-crossing criminals, home just isn't what it used to be."164 Today, the
international community is more tightly interwoven, particularly as a result of
global forces like terrorism. Terrorism, along with other transnational crimes,
encourages States to harmonize their efforts to effectively combat forces
which transcend State boundaries.
The increased mobility of terrorists has greatly undercut the effectiveness
of unilateral terrorist policies and has highlighted the need for uniform,
integrated responses.
[T]he mobility of terrorists, their ability to cross borders, to
acquire resources in one state to use against another state, to
find asylum in foreign sanctuaries, to commit a crime in one
state with weapons from another state against the citizen of
a third state and flee to yet a fourth state, has meant that a
unilateral terrorist policy is problematic. 65
International cooperation is essential. States, therefore, cannot rely on
exclusively unilateral policies to curb the global threat of terrorism."
The increase in tourism and international migration, particularly in
Western Europe, mandates heightened security controls. 67 "Another catalyst
for violence is an intensified freedom of movement that has developed on an
163. Christian Caryl& Gordon Witkin, The Very LongArm ofAmerican Law-A 'ForwardDefense'
Against Organized Crime, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 7, 1997, at 49. Currently, there are over 2000
federal law enforcement agents, including 31 FBI legal attaches, assigned to American embassies overseas.
Id.
164. Id.
165. Crenshaw, supranote 144, at 155.
166. See id
167. See James, supra note 33, at 414.
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enormous scale."'" In addition to the mobility of terrorists, communication,
advanced travel, progressive weaponry, and global publicity have served as
tools for modem terrorists. A recent newspaper article noted that "leading
security experts predict that it is only several years before a terrorist or rogue
nation is capable of an on-line, hacker-style attack against the United States,
causing massive -failure of such crucial elements as banking or the financial
markets, transportation systems, the power grid or telecommunications."'69
Concern regarding use of communication systems, like the Internet, by
terrorists is mounting. "On the Internet, if you're interested, you can get the
formula for sarin, the nerve gas that was employed in the attack in the Tokyo
subway. Such organizations as Sinn Fein and the Shining Path, the Peruvian
terrorists, now have web pages on the Internet."'7 The fear that the Internet
will aid terrorists not only by providing a source for spreading propaganda, but
also by offering a simple and speedy way to deliver their messages, is
increasing. 17'
Further, the organization of terrorist groups have changed considerably
over the past thirty years." Earlier, terrorist groups were organized in
hierarchical structures. However, terrorist groups today are no longer tightly
arranged or cellular; instead, many are decentralized. For example, right wing
groups in Western Europe are informal and operate with leaderless
resistance." These changes in the composition of terrorist groups make
detection and apprehension even more challenging."
VI. FUTURE PROPOSALS
Numerous proposals have been offered as to how the international
community can curtail this global threat. Some argue that the answer to
combating terrorism lies in an authority beyond the traditional State:
168. Id. at 413.
169. M.J. Zuckennan, Targeting Cyberterrorism, USATODAY, Oct. 20, 1997, at 17A.
170. Senate Hearing, supra note 14, at 35.
171. See id.
172. See, e.g., Michael Grunwald & Vernon Loeb, Charges Filed Against Bin Laden; Saudi Exile
Accused ofMasterminding Embassy Bombings, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 1998, at A17 (describing Osama bin
Laden's network as diffuse).
173. See Crenshaw, supranote 144, at 155.
174. Id.
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The modem state is capable only of a kind of policing that
some call prevention or of judgment and punishment that
exiles perpetrators, figured as inherently evil, from any
notion of the body politic. The ethics are in place, but the
symbolic dynamics are askew: none of them leads to a
reevaluation of the parental role of the state. Such a
reevaluation would point, I think, to some new authority other
than that of the nation state. It would point perhaps to an
institutionalization of forms of transnational governance,
seeds of which exist at present in such instruments as trade
agreements, Interpol, international conventions and protocols
against war crimes and genocide, and human rights
legislation. We might envision a body to which prospective
perpetrators might bring grievances even if those prospective
perpetrators do not enjoy legitimation as a state, as is
currently necessary to qualify for the jurisdiction of the
World Court."5
Others recommend measures adopted by the government coupled with the
assistance of other entities: military installations, municipal operations,
defense contractors, and the private sector. 76 In this view, the fight against
terrorism operates on a localized level and entails a joint effort between the
particular State and other actors within it.1"
There are still others who seek a harmonization of international terms and
concepts. They recommend, for example, trying to reach a general agreement
on terms like "political exception" or to recognize terrorism in a broader sense
as a crime against humanity to avoid definitional inconsistencies. "If strongly
enforced with unanimity, measures such as the imposition of laws, which bind
all nations to view terrorist acts as crimes against humanity can be an effective
175. Allen, supra note 10, at 11-12.
176. See James, supra note 33, at 411 n.24.
177. See generally Steven A. MirminaAviation Safety and Secury--LegalDevelopments, 63 J. AIR
L & COM. 547 (1998) (sunmmarizing U.S. legal developments and new techniques for detecting threats
against airports and aircrafts).
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deterrent."'" Likewise, another proposal to effectuate uniformity is to
transnationalize extradition by creating a "single treaty subscribed to by all
nations. '" Additionally, others suggest, in the event that a uniform definition
of terrorism is not feasible, tackling a particular crime frequently associated
with terrorism. For instance, terrorist hijacking incidents could be curbed by
treating the offense the same throughout the international community. They
suggest uniformity regarding the appropriate punitive measures taken. 1s°
Recognizing that the "international legal order lacks a general central law
enforcement authority,""'8 and realizing the shortcomings of the current status
of international law enforcement, has led to proposals for the establishment
of a permanent international criminal court. Currently, no viable alternative
has garnered more time and attention than the International Criminal Court
(ICC). The International Law Commission (ILC) issued a report in 1993
containing a draft statute.'1 After considering comments, the ILC revised its
draft in the following year."l In December 1995, the General Assembly
adopted a resolution creating the United Nations Preparatory Committee and
designated it with the task of establishing the ICC.'" The Preparatory
Committee's mandate was to prepare a widely accepted text of a convention
for such a court using the ILC's draft statute as a framework. At the time of
this writing, the Preparatory Committee has held three, two-week meetings in
1997 and most recently held a Diplomatic Conference in Rome, Italy from
June 15 to July 17, 1998, to finalize and ready the treaty for signature.' The
Statute of the ICC (Rome Statute)" was adopted in July at the close of the
178. Abeyratne, supra note 109, at 491.
179. Phillips, supra note 71, at 354.
180. See Abeyratne, supra note 109, at 474.
181. Jost Delbrlck, A More Effective International Law or a New 'World Law'? Some Aspects of
the Development of International Law in a Changing International System, 68 IND. 1J. 705, 720 (1993).
182. See Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-fifth session, U.N.
GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 255, U.N. Doc. A/48/10 (1993), reprinted in 33 LUM. 256 (1994).
183. See Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-sixth session, U.N.
GAOR, 49th Seas., Supp. No. 10, at 29, U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994).
184. See G.A. Res. 50/46, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/Rest5O/46(1995).
185. See Thomas S. Warrick & M. CherifBassiouni, Organization of the International Criminal
Court: Administrative and Financial Issues, 25 DENY. J. INT'L L & POL'Y 333, 333 (1997); Virginia
Morris & M. Christiane Bourloyannis-Vrailas, The Work of the Sixth Committee at the Fifty-Second
Session on the UN GeneralAssembly, 92 AM. J. INT'L L 568, 571-72 (1998).
186. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (visited Jan. 24, 1999)
<httpJ/gopher.ig.org/00/orgsicundocrome/romestatute.txt> [hereinafter Rome Statutel.
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conference in Rome.' The ICC will come into effect once sixty States have
ratified the treaty."" Presently, the Rome Statue is open for signature in New
York until December 31, 2000.1
The ICC marks a positive international achievement in curtailing global
threats like terrorism. In a general sense, the ICC would reduce the increasing
level of international crimes and also provide a sense of order. It would
provide a fair and impartial forum within which to try accused criminals.'
Such a neutral forum, with a diverse judiciary, 9' offers an opportunity for
increased confidence in the quality and fairness of the proceedings. As a
result, the fear of foreign court bias underlying the exceptions to extradition
for political offenses would decrease. Requests to deliver an accused to the
ICC, rather than comply with extradition requests, offers assurances of
neutrality to distrustful States. Further, the ICC- would "facilitate the
discovery and evaluation of evidence located in different nations.' '"19 The ICC
may present an opportunity to end choice of law problems; a single, unified
body of law would apply. 93  Additionally, States adhering to their
international obligations often fear for the safety of the citizenry. The ICC
might, therefore, diminish a terrorist's inclination to target the citizens of a
particular State as potential hostages or objects of retaliation.
There are two critical issues presented by the ICC: the scope of the
court's jurisdiction and its relationship to national judicial systems. 94
Although the ICC offers numerous noteworthy advantages, there are two
significant ways to improve the ICC Statute. First, the ICC's jurisdiction
should be expanded to encompass any international crime. Second, the ICC
should be designed so that States may consent to jurisdiction on a case-by-case
basis.
187. See Thomas W. Lippman, Worldwde War Crimes High Court isApproved; Delegates Overrule
U.S. Objections, WASH. POST, July 18, 1998, at Al (stating that over 100 delegates approvingly voted for
the establishment of the court at the Rome conference).
188. At this time, seventy-nine States have signed the Rome Statute, but only Senegal has ratified it.
See Rome Statute Signature and Ratification Chart (visited April 4, 1999)
<hittp J/ww.ige. org/icc/-romeMmratifyldrml>.
189. See Rome Statute, supra note 186, at art. 125.
190. See Gianaris, supra note 105, at 110.
191. See Rome Statute, supra note 186, at art 36(7).
192. See Gianaris, supra note 105, at 111.
193. See Phillips, supra note 71, at 356.
194. See Bartram S. Brown, Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the Jurisdiction ofNational
Courts and International Criminal Tribunals, 23 YALE J. INT'L L 383,418 (1998).
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The Rome Statute's preamble provides that the ICC "is intended to
exercise jurisdiction only over the most serious crimes of concern to the
international community as a whole."'95  Article 1 also states that the ICC
"shall be a permanent institution and shall have the power to exercise its
jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international
concern.""' However, the Rome Statute fails to define what constitutes a
serious crime. This creates opportunities for confusion. Would a crime be
serious, for example, based upon the severity of the sentence or based upon
the magnitude of the crime or some combination of the two? Terrorism,
unlike the crime of genocide, sometimes only involves an individual or a small
number of individuals. Would genocide, therefore, fall under the ICC's
jurisdiction while creating a potential loophole for terrorists?
Additionally, the ICC could find a case inadmissible if it lacks "sufficient
gravity."'" What does that language mean? Could the ICC simply refuse
jurisdiction because the case was not serious enough, even when individual
States supported its jurisdiction? The ambiguous statutory language will
provide unnecessary interpretational problems.
Genocide, aggression, war crimes, and crimes against humanity constitute
the core crimes of the ICC's jurisdiction.'" The ICC should not be limited to
these designated crimes, which presumably qualify as serious, but rather the
ICC should serve as a forum for any international crime. Crimes, such as
terrorism or narcotics trafficking, represent just two examples of the wide
variety of criminal activities that are of growing concern. To be an effective
tribunal, the ICC needs flexibility and versatility to respond to the diverse
nature of crimes facing the international community. Otherwise, the ICC runs
the risk of becoming another inadequate remedy, similar to the extradition-
based system, by severely limiting its jurisdiction.
With respect to the ICC's jurisdiction, a State which becomes a party
accepts the jurisdiction of the Court for the crimes set forth in Article 5.1"
Except in the cases of genocide, aggression, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity, the ICC also has jurisdiction if a State files a prospective
195. Rome Statue, supra note 186, at preamble.
196. Id. at art 1.
197. Id. at art. 17(d).
198. Id. at art 5.
199. Id. at art. 12(1).
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declaration with the ICC's Registrar.210 This is an unrealistic arrangement in
light of the age-old and revered concept of State sovereignty. Further, such
meaningless provisions undermine the future efficacy of the ICC. It is highly
unlikely that sovereign States will commit to the court's jurisdiction in
advance and risk having to surrender their nationals to an unfamiliar tribunal
for crimes that have not yet occurred. Instead of relying on these prospective
declarations, States should be allowed to consent on a case-by-case basis.
Allowing States to consent on a case-by-case basis recognizes valid
national interests. Undoubtedly, States are deeply concerned with ceding
national power to such a supranational body.2"' However, the ICC, for
example, offers an alternative solution to a situation like Lockerbie, Scotland,
where it is highly unlikely that the suspects will be extradited for trial in either
the United States or the United Kingdom without a change in the Libyan
government. Libya opposed the extradition of two Libyan citizens who were
indicted in the United States for the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over
Scotland. The guarantee of a neutral forum might encourage such States to
participate in the fight against terrorist acts. 2 Benefits of this nature and
magnitude should lead States to seriously consider yielding some authority to
the ICC so a greater number of international criminals are held accountable.
The likelihood that the ICC will develop into a vital and dynamic
institution is debatable if the ICC does not obtain flexibility to deal with a host
of diverse situations and if States do not retain the ability to consent on a case-
by-case basis. The two suggested changes represent a compromise between
the competing tensions of State sovereignty and the global need for an
effective international tribunal.
CONCLUSION
Terrorism continues to pose a serious global threat to the international
community. Disunity and inconsistencies surrounding the enforcement of
antiterrorist measures continue to linger and, simultaneously, hinder effective
international responses to the global force of terrorism. 'Terrorism is usually
the genus of the species of political discord between nations. The terrorist is
200. Id. at art. 12(3).
201. See Phillips, supra note 71, at 356.
202. See Barbara Crossette, U.S. Dismisses Libyan Offer on Neutral Trial Site for Bomb Suspects,
N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 3, 1992, at AI0 (providing that Libyan Foreign Minister Bishari would be inclined to turn
over the two suspects before a neutral court).
[Vol. 6:685
TERRORISM: A GLOBAL PHENOMENON
well aware of this situation and usually exploits political disharmony among
nations."
The aforementioned proposals all differ in scope and in detail; yet, they
all recognize the need for a harmonized international response. The fight
against terrorism mandates State action; however, conflicting legislative
initiatives, differing legal systems, varying conceptions of terrorism, and
restricting notions of State sovereignty are hindering effective antiterrorist
measures. Terrorism currently pressures States to bond in a new way. The
permanent ICC offers a viable solution. States must consider the value of
yielding some national power to a supranational body, like the ICC, to curb
the global threat of terrorism. To be successful, it is necessary for the Rome
Statute to delicately balance the concern of States in retaining the right to try
suspects in their own national courts against the global interest in an effective
international tribunal. Accordingly, "[a]ny international agreement in the
fight against terrorism must, in a world community marked by heterogeneity
and diversity of interests, inevitably offend the sensitivities of some States,
hold out the prospect of infringing on their national sovereignty, and in
domestic terms possibly even violate well-established civil rights.'104 The ICC
represents a positive step forward for a community of nations; an
internationalized response to not only condemn, but also to combat heinous
crimes like terrorism.
203. Abeyratne, supra note 109, at 471.
204. Smith, supra note 27, at 254-55.
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